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Abstract in English 
We explore the economic implications of the possible Turkish accession to the European Union. 
We focus on three main changes associated with Turkish membership: (i) accession to the 
internal European Market; (ii) institutional reforms in Turkey triggered by EU-membership; and 
(iii) migration in response to the free movement of workers. Overall, the macroeconomic 
implications for EU countries are small but positive. This is caused by cheaper imports and the 
benefits from trade creation. Dutch exports increase by around 20% (550 million euro). Turkey 
experiences larger economic gains than the EU: consumption per capita is estimated to rise by 
about 4% as a result of accession to the internal market and free movement of labour. If Turkey 
would succeed in reforming its domestic institutions in response to EU-membership, economic 
growth in Turkey could increase more. In particular, tentative estimates suggest that 
consumption per capita in Turkey could raise by an additional 9%. These benefits would spill 
over to the EU. For instance, Dutch exports to Turkey would rise by another 1.8 billion euro 
and income by 500 million euro. 
 
Key words: Turkey; Regional economic integration; General equilibrium model; Gravity 
equations; Institutional reform; Migration.  
 
Abstract in Dutch 
Dit document onderzoekt de economische gevolgen van de mogelijke toetreding van Turkije tot 
de Europese Unie. Drie aspecten van het Turkse EU-lidmaatschap staan centraal: (i) toetreding 
tot de Europese interne markt; (ii) hervorming van Turkse instituties als gevolg van het EU- 
lidmaatschap; en (iii) migratie door het vrij verkeer van Turkse werknemers. Uit de analyse 
blijkt dat de economische effecten voor EU-landen klein zijn, maar positief. De voordelen 
worden veroorzaakt door goedkopere importen en extra export-mogelijkheden voor Europese 
bedrijven. De Nederlandse exporten stijgen met 20% (550 miljoen euro). De economische 
voordelen voor Turkije zijn aanzienlijk groter. De consumptie per hoofd van de bevolking kan 
met 4% toenemen als gevolg van de toetreding tot de interne markt en het vrije 
werknemersverkeer. Indien Turkije erin slaagt haar eigen instituties te hervormen in reactie op 
het EU-lidmaatschap, zijn de economische effecten voor Turkije aanzienlijk groter. Volgens 
onze schattingen kan de Turkse consumptie per hoofd van de bevolking mogelijk met zo’n 9% 
extra toenemen. Hiervan profiteert ook de rest van Europa: de Nederlandse export naar Turkije 
zou met 1,8 miljard euro kunnen toenemen en het inkomen met 500 miljoen euro. 
 
Steekwoorden: Turkije; Regionale economische integratie; Algemeen evenwichtsmodel; 
Graviteitsvergelijking; Institutionele hervormingen; Migratie. 
 
Een uitgebreide Nederlandse samenvatting is beschikbaar via www.cpb.nl  
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Preface 
European leaders will decide about a starting date for the negotiations with Turkey about its 
accession to the EU in December 2004, during the Netherlands Presidency. Discussions abound 
these days about the political and economic implications of this next step towards the EU-
membership of Turkey. This CPB document aims to shed light on a number of economic 
aspects associated with this possible further enlargement. In particular, it assesses the economic 
implications for both Turkey and the EU of the accession to the internal market and free 
movement of labour. In addition, it elaborates on the effects of an improvement in Turkish 
institutions, which could be induced by membership of the EU. The analysis in this document 
makes use of estimated gravity equations for trade between Turkey and EU countries, and 
provides simulations with the WorldScan model, CPB’s applied general equilibrium model for 
the world economy.  
 
The research was conducted by Arjan Lejour and Ruud de Mooij from CPB and Clem Capel, 
expert on Turkey from the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs who has worked on the project 
during an eight month research visit at CPB. Ton Brouwer provided support in finalising the 
graphs. The authors benefited from useful discussions in workshops at the Dutch Ministries of 
Economic Affairs and Foreign Affairs and at the conference “Turkey: towards EU accession” in 
Ankara, May 2003, and the Ecomod conference in Istanbul, July 2003. Moreover, comments by 
Casper van Ewijk, Richard Nahuis, Arie Oskam and Paul Tang are gratefully acknowledged.  
 
F.J.H. Don 
Director   
  8  
  9 
Summary 
The possible enlargement of the European Union with Turkey is a major issue of discussion in 
Europe. In 2002, European leaders have promised to decide about a starting date for the 
negotiations on Turkey’s membership at the end of 2004. Discussions about EU-membership of 
Turkey are primarily of a political nature. But also the economic implications have gained 
importance. For one thing, these include the implications for the EU budget. Some studies 
found that, under the current rules, Turkey would receive a substantial net inflow of EU funds, 
which then needs to be financed by the current member states of the EU. For another thing, 
economies may be affected by market integration. In particular, some countries fear for either 
massive immigration flows from Turkey or cheap imports at the cost of European producers. 
This CPB document focuses on these latter, economic implications of the possible Turkish 
accession to the EU. To be clear, assessing the economic implications of the accession of 
Turkey to the EU is virtually impossible. The reason is that we do not know in advance under 
what conditions Turkey will accede. Moreover, it is not a priori clear which effects should be 
attributed to the accession to the EU and which should not. For instance, would internal reforms 
of institutions in Turkey also take place without accession? What scenario would be relevant if 
Turkey would not become an EU member? Is disintegration plausible? Or would a slightly 
deeper customs union be the relevant alternative? Moreover, our analysis ignores the dynamic 
gains of the EU-accession, e.g. due to technology spillovers or the exploitation of economies of 
scale. These effects are potentially important, but difficult to quantify. 
The analysis in this document focuses on the long-term economic implications of three main 
components of the Turkish EU membership: (i) accession of Turkey to the internal market; (ii) 
the impact of internal reforms in Turkey which are potentially induced by EU-membership; and 
(iii) free movement of people between the EU and Turkey. The choice for these components 
implies that we ignore some other potentially important economic effects, such as accession to 
the EMU, and the implications of cohesion policy and the common agricultural policy. These 
latter aspects are difficult to foresee as they depend on the unknown rules applicable at the 
moment of Turkish accession, as well as on the outcome of the political negotiations at that 
time. Moreover, we do not include the implications of EU accession via an increase in foreign 
direct investment into Turkey. These inflows are currently low compared to other countries with 
a similar level of development, so that an increase in light of EU-accession could generate 
substantial economic gains for Turkey.  
Accession of Turkey to the internal market 
A major aspect of the accession of Turkey to the EU involves the internal market. In particular, 
Turkey would have to conform to the entire internal market acquis. Fulfilling these criteria will 
require reforms in Turkey and probably involves short-run costs. In the longer term, it can 
affect the economies of Turkey and EU via more intense trade relations. Indeed, accession to  
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the internal market will increase trade for at least three reasons. First, administrative barriers to 
trade will be eliminated or at least reduced to levels comparable to those between current EU 
members. Here, one can think of reduced costs of passing customs at the frontier: less time 
delays, less formalities etc. Second, accession to the internal market implies a reduction in 
technical barriers to trade. The Single Market reduces these by means of mutual recognition of 
technical regulations, minimum requirements and harmonisation of rules and regulations. 
Although the customs union between Turkey and the EU has already eliminated some of these 
technical barriers, it appears that substantial further advances can be made. Finally, risk and 
uncertainty will be mitigated by Turkey’s accession to the EU. Especially political risk and risk 
associated with macroeconomic instability may decline. On the basis of estimates for the 
current trade barriers between the EU and Turkey, we expect that bilateral trade between 
Turkey and the EU can increase by around one third once Turkey has become a full member of 
the single European market. Trade in textiles, agricultural products and trade services will 
increase most according to our estimates.  
We have translated the potential trade increase in corresponding non-tariff barriers, which 
thus reflect the costs of non-membership of internal market. We then simulated the removal of 
these non-tariff barriers with a macroeconomic model for the world economy. We start with a 
scenario in which the current situation is simply extrapolated into the future, the so-called 
baseline scenario. In this scenario, Turkey’s GDP per capita grows faster than that of the EU by 
about 2.5% per annum due to catching up. Subsequently, we simulate a scenario in which trade 
barriers between the EU and Turkey are removed. The effects of this accession to the internal 
market are evaluated after 20 years. The results suggest that that Turkey will experience an 
additional annual welfare gain (measured by private income) of 4.4 billion US$ (approximately 
€ 3.5 billion at US$1.25 per €). GDP increases by an additional 0.8%. This reflects the gains 
from integration, specialisation and trade creation. The effect for Turkey is larger than that for 
the current EU member states. For them, the macroeconomic impact is positive, but negligible 
in quantitative terms. The reason is that only a small fraction of European exports flow to 
Turkey, while a major part of Turkey’s exports flow to the EU. The Central and Eastern 
European countries that accede to the EU in 2004 will experience a small reduction in the 
production of textiles due to increased competition from Turkey on the internal European 
market. Yet, overall welfare in Central and Eastern Europe increases. 
Reform of Turkish institutions 
To the extent that EU membership acts as a catalyst for institutional reforms in Turkey, this can 
have important implications for the Turkish economy. In particular, better institutions and less 
corruption can improve the trade and investment relations of Turkey with other countries. We 
have estimated this impact and find that it is indeed of significant importance. To illustrate, if 
Turkey would succeed in improving its position on the so-called Transparency International 
Corruption Perceptions Index to a level comparable with that of Portugal, aggregate trade of  
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Turkey could more than double. This would raise GDP in Turkey by 5.6%, and increase welfare 
annually by 28.2 billion US$ (around € 22.5 billion). These effects are substantially larger than 
the impact of accession to the internal market. Also EU countries would benefit from these 
more intense trade relations, yielding an aggregate rise in private income of $ 8.5 billion 
(approximately € 7 billion), of which 7% would accrue to the Netherlands. 
Migration 
Large income disparities between Turkey and the EU provide incentives for Turkish people to 
migrate to the EU. On the basis of existing studies on the migration potential for Central and 
Eastern European countries, we expect that 2.7 million people will permanently move from 
Turkey to the EU in the longer term (taking account of population developments in Turkey). 
The majority of these people will settle in Germany, where Turks have settled in the past as 
well. Around 4% of the Turks will move to the Netherlands. With our macroeconomic model, 
we have explored the macroeconomic effects of these immigration flows. On the assumption 
that Turkish immigrants occupy low-skilled jobs, as historical patterns for the Netherlands seem 
to support, we find that GDP falls in Turkey by 1.8% and increases in the EU by 0.5%. Since 
the corresponding effects in terms of population are larger, income per capita rises in Turkey 
and slightly falls in the EU. This is because firms are not perfectly mobile, so that the ratio 
between the number of employees and the amount of capital increases in the EU and declines in 
Turkey. Therefore, wages in Turkey tend to rise, while they fall in the EU. Wages for low-
skilled workers in the EU fall by 0.9% more relative to those for high-skilled workers as 
immigrants compete for low-skilled jobs. If Turkish immigrants would have better skills, e.g. 
the same skill distribution as in the EU, immigration would have no impact on the wage 
distribution, larger effects on GDP in the EU, and more negative effects on aggregate GDP in 
Turkey.   
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1  Introduction 
These days, the possible enlargement of the European Union with Turkey is a major issue of 
discussion. With the accession of ten new member states in May 2004 and perhaps the 
subsequent accession of Bulgaria and Romania in a couple of years from now, Turkey is the 
thirteenth candidate member state of the EU. Unlike with Bulgaria and Romania, accession 
negotiations with Turkey have not yet started. At the Council in Copenhagen in December 
2002, European leaders have, however, promised to decide about a starting date for the 
negotiations in December 2004, at the end of the Dutch Presidency. In particular, the 
Copenhagen Council concludes that: “If the European Council in December 2004, on the basis 
of a report and a recommendation from the Commission, decides that Turkey fulfils the 
Copenhagen political criteria, the European Union will open accession negotiations with Turkey 
without delay”. These political criteria, formulated in Copenhagen in 1993, require a candidate 
country to have achieved stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, 
human rights and respect for and protection of minorities.
1  
Turkey has applied for EU membership already in 1987. To pave the way for its accession, 
it agreed upon a Customs Union with the EU in 1995. Between 1996 and 2001, tariffs and 
quantitative restrictions on trade between Turkey and the EU were gradually removed. 
Moreover, Turkey aligned its trade policies with the EU vis-à-vis third countries and started to 
implement common standards, rules and regulations. In 1999, Turkey attained the status of 
candidate for membership of the EU. As a result, the EU is now cooperating with Turkey to 
enable the adoption of the acquis communautaire, i.e. the rules and regulations that make the 
EU.  
Despite progress in the economic integration between the EU and Turkey, a number of 
Europeans seem reluctant to accept Turkey as a member of the EU for a variety of reasons. 
Some people argue that Turkey is too different from the rest of Europe. They refer to the 
different culture of the Turkish society, the Islam religion among the majority of the population, 
and the fact that Turkey is largely an Asian rather than a European country. The main official 
reason for keeping Turkey from negotiating with the EU could be the argument that the political 
criteria spelled out above have not yet been met. Meeting them would require, among other 
things, a fundamentally different role for the military in Turkey, and the recognition of 
individual and collective rights for minority groups. Another reason why countries are reluctant 
about the Turkish accession to the EU is related to its size, although this reason is often used in 
combination with the subjective views. In particular, population forecasts suggest that the 
Turkish population will exceed that of Germany by 2020, implying that Turkey would become 
the biggest country in the EU. Accordingly, it would obtain substantial power in EU decision 
making, at the cost of the powers of existing members. Countries also fear the economic 
 
1 At the same time economic and institutional criteria were formulated: (i) a functioning market economy and the capacity to 
cope with competitive pressures and market forces within the Union; and (ii) comply with the acquis communautaire.  
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implications of Turkey’s accession to the EU. In particular, Turkey would become a net 
recipient of EU funds, which implies a net cost for existing member states. In addition, people 
in Western Europe fear massive immigration flows from Turkey and cheap imports at the cost 
of workers and producers in the EU.  
This paper concentrates on the economic implications of the Turkish accession to the EU. 
Although these are not official criteria for the decision about its accession, they do play an 
important role in the discussion. In particular if the official criteria do not lead to a clear-cut 
decision, the economic arguments could become decisive. How much will the accession of 
Turkey benefit or cost European producers and consumers in terms of production and welfare? 
Which sectors will gain and which will lose? Is there a difference between European countries? 
In answering these questions, we may rely on existing studies that have assessed the 
economic effects of regional economic integration. In particular, a number of studies have 
simulated the implications of the enlargement of the EU with the countries from Central and 
Eastern Europe (See De Mooij and Tang (2003) for a review). They show that enlargement will 
probably yield substantial gains for the new Member States, with estimates ranging from 1.5% 
to 7.8% increases in GDP in the long term. For EU countries, the effects are typically more 
modest but still positive: the European Commission reports the largest increase in GDP of 0.4% 
in the long run (European Commission, 2001). 
It is not a priori clear, however, that the accession of Turkey will yield similar effects as is 
predicted by studies for Central and Eastern Europe. Indeed, there are several differences 
between the accession of Turkey and that with the other countries. For instance, the EU and 
Turkey already form a Customs Union in manufacturing and services, and a number of 
standards and regulations have already been harmonised.
2 Hence, the extent to which accession 
of Turkey to the EU will deepen the integration differs from that of the Central and Eastern 
European countries. Moreover, the structure of the Turkish economy differs from that of 
Central and Eastern European countries, e.g. with respect to its degree of openness, its sectoral 
structure, and its level of welfare. These differences can affect the increase in bilateral trade and 
GDP of further integration with the EU. In this study, we use a CGE model that incorporates the 
specific structure of the Turkish economy to assess the impact of its accession to the EU. 
Moreover, we pay due attention to what can be expected from further steps in the integration 
process. 
Apart from the macroeconomic implications, we also explore how Turkey’s accession to the 
EU affects different countries in Europe and different industries. For instance, the impact on 
Central and Eastern European countries may differ from that on current EU member states 
because the former countries specialise in similar products as Turkey. With respect to the 
sectoral implications, the removal of economic barriers to integration may have different 
 
2 The EU and the countries of Central and Eastern Europe eliminate bliateral import tariffs in manufacturing already during 
the 1990s. However these Europe agreements implied less trade integration than the customs union between Turkey and 
the EU. For instance, a customs union also involves the same external tariffs with respect to third countries. 
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implications for the labour-intensive agricultural and textile sectors than for skill-intensive 
sectors. 
In exploring these questions, the paper follows the approach of Lejour et al. (2004). For 15 
different industries, we derive the potential trade between the EU and Turkey from estimating 
gravity equations. By comparing this potential trade with actual trade, we estimate the tariff 
equivalent of the remaining trade barriers between Turkey and the EU. These barriers are then 
removed to simulate the accession of Turkey to the EU internal market, thereby using a 
computable general equilibrium (CGE) model for the world economy that is calibrated on data 
for 2001. 
In the process of accession Turkey has to comply with the acquis communautaire. This 
could act as a catalyst for improving institutions in Turkey. Many institutional indicators show 
that these institutions are less market-oriented in Turkey than in the EU member states or the 
other accession countries. We investigate to what extent a reform of these institutions could 
benefit the Turkish economy by improving its competitive position. Again, we do this by 
deriving the potential trade between Turkey and other countries if the institutions would be 
improved. We then simulate the macroeconomic effects of this trade increase with our CGE 
model.  
As a final step, we elaborate on the potential migration flows following the accession of 
Turkey to the EU. With our CGE model, we explore the implications for labour markets.  
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses the Turkish economy and 
the main developments in the recent past. Section 3 demonstrates what kind of shocks the 
accession of Turkey to the EU would imply. Section 4 elaborates on the main features of the 
WorldScan model and assesses the impact of various shocks on the economies of both the EU 
and Turkey. Finally, section 6 concludes. 
  
  16  
  17 
2  The Turkish economy 
2.1  Historical developments in the Turkish economy 
Macroeconomic development 
After the collapse of the Ottoman Empire in the early 1920’s, a new leadership tried to rebuild 
the Turkish economy. Much was borrowed from the Soviet model, right down to production 
plans and an emphasis on the development of heavy industry by state enterprises. During the 
1960’s and 1970’s, state policy was still inward-looking, excessively protective for the own 
industries and based on state-run companies. This led in the late 1970’s to a cease in economic 
growth, a contraction of industrial production and an inflation rate to over 100%. In response to 
this in the early 1980’s, the first serious efforts were made to move the country towards a 
market economy with an international exposure. An ambitious program was launched to reduce 
subsidies and price controls, deregulate interest rates, privatise state enterprises, and liberalise 
trade. 
Figure 2.1 shows the development of the Turkish economy since 1980 by means of the 
volume of GDP. We observe a steady growth during the first halve of the 1980’s, with annual 
growth rates that run up to 10%. Since then, there is greater volatility in the economic 
development. Years of high growth are followed by years of stagnation. In 1994, Turkey ran 
into serious problems with its public finances, causing a contraction in production. In 1999, a 
new deterioration of public finances emerged, accompanied by another decline in GDP. This 
was followed by the banking crisis of 2000-2001, causing a collapse of the exchange rate. From 
2000 to 2001, the level of GDP measured in US$ dropped from 201 to 147 billion US$, a 
decline of 27%. 
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Source: World Bank (2003a) and Statistical Yearbook of Turkey 2003. 
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Source: World Bank (2003a) and Statistical Yearbook of Turkey 2003  
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 Sources: World Bank (2003a) and Statistical Yearbook of Turkey 2003. 
 
The unstable development in GDP during the last two decades has been accompanied by high 
rates of inflation. Between 1988 and 1993, inflation was never below 60% and peaked at 
106.3% in 1995 (see figure 2.2). In recent years, inflation slightly declined. In 2002, a rate of 
29.7% was the lowest of the last two decades.  
Poor public finance management has played an important role in the crises of Turkey. In 
fact, various semi-autonomous budgetary funds are responsible for public expenditure 
programs. These funds have a high degree of autonomy but face soft budget constraints (Sak, 
2000). This has led to large problems in public finances on several occasions. For instance, the 
IMF reports a public sector deficit in 1999 up to 24% of GDP, partly because the government 
took over a number of bankrupt commercial banks. As a result, the crisis was accompanied by 
an increase in the debt/GNP ratio from 51% in 1999 to 96.7% in 2001(figure 2.3). Except for 
the debt increase, the contraction in GDP also contributed to this increase of nearly 50%-points. 
In response to these problems with its public finances, Turkey, in cooperation with the IMF, has 
launched a reform program to close down various funds, privatise state enterprises and reform 
the financial sector. Outside pressure, i.e. induced by the prospect to become EU member, may 
help to obtain these objectives.  
Migration 
Emigration of Turks to the European Union dates back to the 1960s. Driven by shortage of 
workers, European countries introduced guest-worker programs to temporarily employ Turkish 
workers. The inflow of Turkish labour immigration in Western Europe peaked between 1969  
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and 1973. Since then, migration policies have become more restrictive. From the late 1970’s, 
Turkish workers have increasingly migrated (often temporarily) towards Arab countries to earn 
money, primarily in the construction sector, restaurants and the transport sector. Since the early 
1990’s, emigration towards the former Soviet Union has taken over this role. Figure 2.4 shows 
that Turkish migration flows into EU-countries were rather modest since the 1980s.  
Figure 2.4  Gross inflows of Turkish immigrants in % of destination countries’ population, 1984 – 1995 (and 








1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002
Belgium France Germany Netherlands  
Source: Trends in international migration, OECD Sopemi 2002; CBS (2003) for the Netherlands. 
 
Turkish migrants in the 1960’s and 1970’s have primarily settled in Germany and the 
Netherlands. As network effects are the dominant factor for the destination of later migrants, the 
majority of immigration of Turks in Europe during the 1980’s and 1990’s is also found in these 
countries. This is shown in figure 2.4, which expresses Turkish immigration in terms of the 
domestic population of four destination countries between 1984 and 1995 (and to 2002 for the 
Netherlands). It reveals that the number of Turkish immigrants in Germany and the Netherlands 
was larger than in Belgium and France. Today, approximately 2.1 million Turks have settled in 
Germany and 250 thousand in the Netherlands.
3 
Immigration can have important implications for the source country due to remittances.
 4 
This is shown in figure 2.5. Remittances can be an important source of external funding for a 
 
3 A relatively large share of the guest workers who came to Germany was relatively well-educated. Indeed, about one third 
of the entrants have an education similar to German standards (Akgunduz (2000)). As the Netherlands was relatively late in 
promoting the immigration of Turkish guest workers, they received immigrants with less education. Accordingly, the 
integration of Turkish immigrants in the German society was easier than in the Netherlands.  
4 Source countries may also suffer from a brain drain, i.e. high-skilled workers leaving the country at the detriment to the low-
skilled that are left behind. Empirical evidence on brain-drain effects is scarce, however.  
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country. According to the World Bank (2003b) that is the case for many developing countries. 
In Turkey, the flows increase national income by about 3%. The remittances are larger than the 
annual FDI inflows in Turkey. Nowadays remittances are less important for Turkey than twenty 
years ago. The funds partly originate from EU countries. A substantial share of today’s 
remittances, however, is transferred from Turks working in Arab countries.   










1980 1985 1990 1995 2000  
Source: Worldbank (2003a). 
 
2.2  Current situation in Turkey 
Key economic indicators 
Table 2.1 shows some key economic indicators of the Turkish economy in 2000, i.e. the year 
before the crisis. The table compares these indicators with the EU-15, the countries that will 
accede to the EU in 2004 (Accession-10), and Bulgaria and Romania. We see that Turkey is a 
relatively large accession country. Its size in terms of population (more than 68 million people) 
approaches that of the Accession-10 and exceeds the size of each current EU Member State, 
except for Germany. The Turkish accession would imply that the EU population would increase 
by more than 17%. 
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Table 2.1    Key economic indicators for Turkey in 2000, compared with other regions 
  Population 
(millions) 
GDP  
(current bln. US$) 
Per capita GNI  
 (PPP in % EU-15) 
       
EU-15  376.3  8325  100 
Accession-10  75.1  330  44 
Bulgaria  7.9  12  23 
Romania  22.4  33  27 
Turkey  68.6  199  30 
       
Source: World Bank (2003a). 
 
In terms of GDP, the accession of Turkey would imply a more modest expansion of the EU. 
Indeed, GDP would rise by 2.2% of today’s level of GDP in the EU-15. The Turks thus earn a 
much lower income per capita than the average EU citizen. Expressed in terms of purchasing 
power parities, gross national income per capita in Turkey is only 30% of that in the EU-15. 
This income is of a similar level as in Romania and somewhat higher than in Bulgaria. It is, 
however, below the average level in the Accession-10, which is 44% of the EU-15 average in 
2000. The unemployment rate in Turkey was 8.5% in 2000.
5 
Regional disparities 
Table 2.2 shows that the level of welfare in Turkey is not distributed equally across regions. 
Two regions, the Aegean region and the Marmara region, are much richer than the rest of 
Turkey. The latter region, with Istanbul as its capital city, features a per capita income that 
exceeds the Turkish average by more than 50%. The region inhabits more than 17 million 
people and is the largest in Turkey. The (south) eastern part of Anatolia is by far the poorest 
region. The average per capita income in East Anatolia is less than 30% of the Turkish average. 
This is less than one fifth of that in the Marmara region.  
The substantial regional income disparities cause large-scale migration flows in Turkey 
from poor to rich regions. Indeed, the population in the Marmara region during the nineties 
grew by more than one quarter. In the touristy Mediterranean region, the growth rate was more 
than 20% (Statistical Yearbook of Turkey, 2001). These income disparities are also relevant for 
the distribution EU funds after the accession. 
 
 
5 Note that the 2001 crisis has severely reduced the welfare level in Turkey measured in US$. Moreover, the unemployment 
rate increased from 8.5% to 9.9% in 2001.  
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Table 2.2    Regional disparities in Turkey, 2000 
  Population  
(million) 
Per capita GDP in %  
Turkish average 
     
Mediterranean Region  8.7  94 
East Anatolia  8.1  28 
Aegean Region  9.0  130 
Southeast Anatolia  6.6  54 
Central Anatolia  11.6  97 
Black Sea Region  8.4  76 
Marmara (Istanbul) Region  17.3  153 
     
Source: Statistical Yearbook of Turkey, 2001. 
 
Trade relations 
Trade liberalisation has been an important aspect of Turkey’s economic policy since the early 
1980’s. It led to the formation of the Customs Union between Turkey and the EU in 1995, 
which covers trade in industrial goods and processed agricultural products. The agreement with 
Turkey goes beyond a normal Customs Union, though. It also covers the harmonisation of 
technical legislation, the abolishment of monopolies and the protection of intellectual property. 
Moreover, negotiations have been started on the mutual opening of the public procurement 
markets, liberalisation of trade in services, and the abolition of restrictions on the freedom of 
establishment. These latter policies would prepare Turkey for membership of the EU.  
Trade liberalisation has intensified economic integration of Turkey and the rest of the world. 
To illustrate, whereas the sum of imports and exports as a share of GDP was still only 18% in 
1980, this share has increased to almost 50% in 1999.  
Table 2.3 shows the openness of Turkey and other accession countries in terms of their 
export/gdp ratio. Openness depends not only on trade policies, but also on other factors like the 
sectoral structure and the size of the economy. In particular, large countries are generally less 
open to trade than small countries. Table 2.3 shows that Turkey, being the largest country in the 
table, is least open. It exports slightly more than 21% of its GDP. For an average country in the 
EU-15, this share is almost 28% and in the Accession-10 almost 38%. Bulgaria features a high 
share of more than 60%. A relatively low degree of openness implies that a trade increase due 
to the internal market has less effect on the total economy than for countries with a higher 
degree of openness.  
Most European countries export only a small part of all their goods and services to Turkey. 
Indeed, the average export share of the EU-15 to Turkey is 1.2%. This share is four times 
smaller than for the other accession countries, which feature an average export share of around 
5%. An average Accession-10 country has Turkey as a destination for only 0.5% of all exports. 
Being neighbouring countries, Bulgaria and Romania bring 10.3% and 6.1% of their exports to 
Turkey, respectively. The final column of table 2.3 shows the export shares with a destination in 
the EU-15. We see that, similar to Accession-10 and Bulgaria and Romania, the majority of all  
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exports from Turkey are transported to the EU-15. This reflects the agreement on the customs 
union between Turkey and the EU, which has intensified economic integration between these 
regions since 1995.  
Table 2.3    Trade relations, 2001 
  Export in % of GDP  Export share to Turkey  Export share to EU-15  
       
EU-15  27.9  1.2  62.1 
Accession-10  37.8  0.5  59.1 
Bulgaria  60.2  10.3  51.7 
Romania  26.9  6.1  64.0 
Turkey  21.4                                   -    52.3 
       
Source: IMF, Directorate of Trade Statistics 2002. 
 
Irrespective of the degree of openness, the integration of Turkey with the EU is somewhat less 
advanced compared to the EU-15 and the Accession-10. The reason is that various barriers to 
trade between Turkey and the EU-15 have maintained, despite the Customs Union. In 
particular, Turkey still has to take and implement measures concerning the removal of technical 
barriers to trade, harmonise commercial policy, align to the preferential customs regime, and 
abolish state monopolies and state aid.
6 A part of these measures is related to the institutions in 
Turkey. Hence, there is room for further integration if Turkey would indeed conform to all the 
rules of the internal European market and is able to reform its institutions. 
Sectoral structure 
Table 2.4 reveals how total value added in Turkey is divided between fifteen different sectors. It 
shows value-added shares in percent of total value-added for Turkey, the Accession-10, 
Bulgaria, Romania and the EU-15. We see that the Turkish economy features a relatively large 
share of value added in Agriculture of 14.2%. This share is smaller than that for Bulgaria and 
Romania, where the Agricultural sector comprises 28.2% and 19.3% of total value added, 
respectively. It is much larger, however, than in the Accession-10, where the Agricultural sector 
is responsible for 6.9% of value added, and the EU-15 where it is only 2.5%.
7 One reason for 
the large agricultural sector in Turkey is the substantial amount of agricultural support by the 
Turkish government. In particular, transfers to farmers run up to 5% of GDP. In addition, there 
are guaranteed output prices, import protection, export subsidies, subsidised services to farmers 
and sometimes state involvement in supply. Under pressure of the WTO and with the prospect 
 
6 At the end of 2000, the EU Embassies’ Commercial Councillors in Ankara reported to Brussels several problem areas, 
varying from excessive bureaucracy to difficulties in applying the requirements of the Customs Union in letter and spirit. Lack 
of well trained civil servants is a major problem, implying that companies find it difficult to get the right information on import 
requirements and causing unnecessary delays. EC (2003) and Togan et al. (2003) also report that Turkey has not 
incorporated the instruments to remove technical barriers to trade in its legal order. 
7 Measured in terms of employment, the share of the Agricultural sector in Turkey is larger since productivity levels are low. 
Indeed, 33% of all working people is employed in Agriculture. Only in Romania, this figure is higher with a share of 45.2%. In 
the Accession-10, 15.5% of total employment works in the Agricultural sector, while in the EU-15 this share is 4.3%.  
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of future accession to the EU, Turkish agricultural policy is now being gradually reformed. The 
aim is to bring it more in line with the CAP and reduce the amount of public support. The 
reforms may have substantial implications for the agricultural sector in Turkey in the coming 
years. 
Apart from Agriculture, Turkey also features relatively large Textiles, Trade Services and 
Transport Services sectors.
8 These sectors are labour-intensive and feature relatively low 
productivity levels. The tourism sector is part of Trade Services and Transport Services and is 
important for the Turkish economy.
9 Compared to the Accession-10, Turkey features a low 
share in Machinery and Equipment, Transport Equipment and Business Services.  
 
Table 2.4    Value-added for sectors in % of total value added, 2001 
           
           
  Turkey  Accession-10  Bulgaria  Romania  EU-15 
           
Agriculture  14.2  6.7  28.2  19.3  2.5 
Energy  3.6  3.2  4.5  5.3  1.8 
Food processing  6.2  5.6  9.9  13.8  3.1 
Textiles  2.3  1.0  3.6  1.5  0.6 
Wearing apparel  1.3  1.3  0.8  4.2  0.5 
Chemicals and minerals  3.8  5.6  8.0  4.6  4.7 
Other manufacturing  2.1  4.8  2.7  4.1  3.6 
Metals  1.3  1.8  2.5  1.1  0.9 
Machinery and equipment  3.2  8.2  4.4  5.0  7.7 
Transport equipment  1.4  2.4  0.5  2.4  2.6 
Transport services  11.6  5.7  5.8  6.8  4.7 
Trade services  20.6  12.7  4.0  6.2  12.8 
Business services  7.1  16.7  19.7  15.9  18.2 
Other services  16.9  18.0  3.4  3.9  30.6 
Construction  4.5  6.2  2.1  5.7  5.7 
           
Source: Dimaranan and McDougall (2004) and own calculations. 
 
Export specialisation 
Table 2.5 shows the so-called revealed comparative advantages of Turkey. In particular, the 
first column presents the share of exports of a particular sector in Turkey, relative to the average 
share of that sector in other countries’ export (and multiplied by 100). If a sector features an 
index larger than 100, then it is said that Turkey specialises its exports in that sector, i.e. it has a 
revealed comparative advantage in that sector relative to other countries. According to this 
index, table 2.5 reveals that Turkey specialises in Agriculture, Textiles, Wearing Apparel, and 
 
8See Francois (2003) for an elaborate analysis of the implications of the Turkish accession to the EU for the transport sector. 
9The size of the sector Trade Services is surprisingly high. The number corresponds to recent data of the Statistical 
Yearbook of Turkey 2001. These numbers show that the number is inflated by the size of the wholesale and retail sector. 
This subsector from trade services delivers 16.8% of value added in 2001. It is possible that the Turkish Statistical Office 
classifies economic activities as wholesale and retail trade that are classified as business services in other countries.  
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most Services sectors (excluding Trade Services). The exports of Textiles, Wearing Apparel, 
Transport and Business Services are also important in absolute terms: they make up more than 
50% of all exports of Turkey, since these sectors are relatively open.
10  
The comparative advantages of Turkey to some extent mimic those from the other accession 
countries (see Lejour et al., 2004). In particular, both specialise in Agriculture, Textiles and 
Wearing Apparel. Accordingly, the accession of Turkey to the EU could affect the 
competitiveness of the Central and Eastern European Countries in these sectors. Yet, there are 
also some important differences. Most of the Accession-10 countries export more machinery 
products and more products from the Food Processing industry, while Turkey exports relatively 
more Business and Other Services.  




Export in % total exports 
 
Exports in % of production 
 
       
Agriculture  225  4.5  7.9 
Energy  18  1.0  4.0 
Food processing  82  2.9  7.3 
Textiles  534  13.4  63.5 
Wearing apparel  403  9.6  72.9 
Chemicals and minerals  63  7.3  24.9 
Other manufacturing  52  3.0  15.8 
Metals  144  5.9  34.7 
Machinery and equipment  38  10.9  42.6 
Transport equipment  71  6.8  54.9 
Transport services  129  10.3  21.5 
Trade services  81  2.5  3.7 
Business services
a  151  11.3  40.9 
Other services
a  125  5.9  11.3 
Construction
a  696  4.6  16.2 
       
Source: Dimaranan and McDougall (2004) and own calculations.  
aThe ratio of exports to production in business and other services, and construction is much higher than in other countries. Given the low 
quality of the service trade data it is not clear that these data reflect a strong international position of Turkey in these sectors.  
 
Foreign direct investment 
Turkey could be an attractive location for foreign investors. For instance, the country could 
serve as a gateway between Europe and the Middle East, while a large domestic market and 
cheap labour yield important location advantages. Yet, Turkey does not attract much FDI: it 
ranks only 86
st out of 91 on the FDI inflows as a percentage of GDP in developing and 
transition countries (see UNCTAD, 2003).  
Table 2.6 illustrates this by showing the stock of foreign direct investment (FDI) in Turkey 
in 2000. It compares it with three other accession countries: Poland, Czech Republic and 
 
10 Not every sector in which Turkey has a comparative advantage is important for trade. Take for example Construction: 
Turkey has a comparative advantage in this sector, but since trade in Construction is fairly low, it does not contribute much 
to the openness of the Turkish economy  
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Hungary. We see that, compared to these countries, the stock of FDI as a share of GDP in 
Turkey is indeed substantially smaller. Whereas Czech Republic and Hungary feature stocks 
with a value exceeding 40% of their GDP, the value of the Turkish stock comprises less than 
5% of GDP.  
Table 2.6    Stock of foreign direct investment in Turkey and three accession countries, 2000 
  Bln. US$  % of GDP  Share from 




Industry in % 
Share in 
Services in % 
             
Turkey  9.3  4.7  68.7  1.5  41.3  57.3 
Poland  34.2  21.7  78.8  0.9  38.6  60.5 
Czech Republic  21.6  42.1  84.0  2.0  38.1  59.8 
Hungary  19.8  42.5  80.2  1.5  36.8  61.7 
             
Source: Dutz et al. (2003). 
 
The reason for this poor performance of Turkey in terms of FDI is related to both institutional 
and macroeconomic factors (see Dutz et al. (2002) and FIAS (2001)). First of all, potential 
investors often encounter a difficult institutional environment when they come to Turkey. For 
instance, in a recent set of interviews (FIAS 2001), potential investors frequently mention the 
poor implementation of rules, inconsistent application of law, incompetent bureaucrats and lack 
of judicial enforcement. Turkish bureaucracy is widely perceived to be inefficient. The 
investment process has been burdened with lengthy, unnecessarily cumbersome and 
unpredictable, even unprofessional, procedures. Acquiring building permits, environmental 
clearances or a trademark registration may take years. Getting an investment registered is 
complicated. Yet another deterrent to investors is corruption. In the Transparency International 
Corruption Perceptions Index, Turkey ranks 64
th out of the 102 countries listed (see section 
3.3). Recently Turkey has ratified a civil law convention on corruption, but corruption remains 
at a persistently high level (EC, 2003). Complaints about Turkey’s system of corporate taxation 
abound among potential investors: the system is complex and full of distortions.  
A second impediment to invest in the Turkish economy is macroeconomic instability. The 
economy has moved erratically with high inflation rates, large fluctuations in exchange rates, 
and problematic public finances. This unstable macroeconomic environment has further scared 
foreign investors. 
Table 2.6 suggests that a relatively small share of all FDI is invested by European 
companies. In particular, compared to the other accession countries, Turkey receives a large 
share of FDI from non-OECD countries. As in the other accession countries, most foreign 
capital is invested in Services sectors. In Turkey, this especially refers to Finance (16.6% of 
total FDI) and Transport (17% of total FDI). The tourist sector in Turkey has received 4.4% of 
all FDI (more about FDI in Turkey, see Van Dijk, 2003). 
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3  Turkey’s accession to the EU 
3.1  Turkey’s development without accession 
How would the Turkish economy develop over the next twenty years if the country would not 
accede to the EU? One can imagine different scenarios. Turkey could integrate economically 
with the EU, without becoming a full member. In that case, the Customs Union may be further 
deepened, without Turkey becoming part of the internal market. Alternatively, Turkey could 
become disappointed about its cooperation with the EU and decide to focus more on its 
relationship with its eastern neighbours in Asia. In that case, a process of disintegration with the 
EU may become real.  
Uncertainty about the future development in the absence of accession to the EU renders it 
difficult to assess the economic implications of the accession itself. Against what scenario 
should we compare the accession? In model simulations, the usual approach is to develop a so-
called baseline scenario in which the current situation is extrapolated into the future. Thus, the 
baseline neither assumes a tendency towards disintegration, nor a tendency towards more 
integration. The impact of the accession to the EU is then determined by comparing the 
economic outcomes of a scenario with accession to the baseline.  
In the next section, we follow this approach by simulating the economic implications of the 
Turkish accession with our CGE model. Thus, we develop a baseline until 2025 in which the 
relationship between Turkey and the EU remains as it is today, i.e. a customs union in industrial 
products, a limited degree of integration with respect to the internal market, but neither full 
membership of the EU nor further integration in other respects. In the baseline, we include a 
number of developments inside and outside Turkey which can be foreseen with certainty. For 
instance, we assume that ten candidate countries from Central and Eastern Europe become 
member of the EU in 2004. Moreover, Bulgaria and Romania are assumed to accede in 2007. 
We also assume that the international agreement of textiles and clothing (ATC) vanishes in 
2005 such that the Turkish textile sector will face more competition from Asian countries. With 
regard to Turkey, we include demographic projections based on the UN, which suggests that 
population grows from 68 million in 2001 to around 86 million in 2025. We do not include 
substantial reforms in Turkish policy as compared to today’s situation. Economic growth in 
Turkey in the baseline scenario exceeds that in the EU due to a catching up. In particular, the 
baseline assumes a real growth rate of GDP of 5.6% per year in Turkey, which is partly due to a 
relatively fast growing population. GDP per capita grows annually by 4.5%.
11 In the Accession-
10, growth is lower at 2.9% per year, in part because of a gradual shrinking population (0.3% 
annually). GDP in the EU is assumed to grow at 2% per year during the coming decades.  
 
11Differences in total factor productivity growth rates for the manufacturing sectors in Turkey are taken from Filiztekin (2000). 
These data for the period 1980-1996 indicate high productivity growth in the sectors Metals and Machinery and Equipment 
and low productivity growth in food processing and other manufacturing. Also in Textiles and Wearing Apparel, productivity 
growth is lower than the average in manufacturing.   
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Relative to the baseline scenario, we explore the economic implications of the Turkish 
accession. In particular, we determine first the long-term economic outcomes in the baseline 
scenario and then compare them with the outcomes in a scenario with accession of Turkey. 
Thereby, we assume that Turkey becomes a member of the EU in 2010. The exact date, 
however, has no significant impact on the long-term simulation outcomes. An important 
question is: what effects do we attribute to the accession of Turkey. In the next four subsections, 
we discuss four changes that are induced by Turkey’s accession to the EU. These are, 
respectively, accession to the internal European market, an improvement of Turkish institutions 
in response to EU-membership, free movement of labour, and access of Turkey to EU funds. 
The last effect is not simulated in our CGE model, for reasons explained below. 
3.2  Accession to the internal market 
A major economic aspect of the accession of Turkey to the EU involves the accession to the 
internal market. This will affect the economies of Turkey and EU members via trade, FDI, 
domestic investment, and so on. The focus here is on the trade effect of the internal market.
12   
Accession to the internal market may increase trade for at least three reasons. First, 
administrative barriers to trade will be eliminated or at least reduced to levels comparable to 
those between current EU members. Here, one can think of reduced costs of passing customs at 
the frontier: less time delays, less formalities etc. Anecdotic evidence suggests that there is a lot 
to be gained here in the case of Turkey. Secondly, accession to the internal market implies a 
reduction in technical barriers to trade. The Single Market reduces these technical barriers by 
means of mutual recognition of different technical regulations, minimum requirements and 
harmonisation of rules and regulations. Although the customs union between Turkey and the 
EU has already eliminated some of these technical barriers, it appears that substantial further 
advances have to be made. Finally, risk and uncertainty will be mitigated by the Turkish 
accession to the EU. Especially political risks and macroeconomic instability may reduce 
substantially.  
In measuring the economic implications of accession to the internal market, we follow the 
approach of Lejour et al. (2004). That study shows for the countries from Central and Eastern 
Europe that the accession to the internal market is much more important than the elimination of 
bilateral trade tariffs and common external tariffs as in a customs union. That conclusion and 
the existing customs union between Turkey and the EU in manufacturing suggest that the 
accession to the internal market is the relevant issue, and not the elimination of remaining tariffs 
and harmonisation of external tariffs.
13 Lejour et al. (2004) measure the economic consequences 
 
12 Van Dijk (2003) analyses the effects of the internal market on FDI. 
13 Bekmez (2002) interprets full EU membership of Turkey more or less as the elimination of remaining tariffs and 
harmonised external tariffs. He shows that the effects of EU membership given the existing Customs Union are meagre.  
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of accession in two steps. First, they follow Bergstrand (1989) in estimating gravity equations 
on the industry level .These equations are specified as:
14  
 
Xijs = αs Zijs  + βs Dijs
EU                               (1) 
 
where Xijs stands for the log of exports from country i to j in industry s. The vector Zijs contains 
several explanatory variables, including GDP (per capita) of the exporting and importing 
countries, the distance between the capitals of countries, a set of dummies, and the bilateral 
import and export tariffs between countries. The vector α￿s contains the parameters we estimate 
for each sector. The variable D
EU is a dummy that equals unity if i and j are currently members 
of the EU and else zero. Our main interest is in the estimated coefficient for the EU dummy, 
D
EU. For each of the 15 sectors this coefficient, β￿s, is estimated by OLS using a cross-section of 
38 countries for 2001 based on the GTAP data (Dinamaran and McDougall 2004). The 
estimates for the EU dummy are reported in the first column of table 3.1. The estimates for the 
other coefficients are presented in appendix A.  
Table 3.1 reveals that in twelve out of fifteen industries, the dummy has a positive and 
significant coefficient (at the 10% confidence level). Hence, in these sectors, bilateral trade is 
systematically higher if two countries are both members of the EU. The dummies for 
Agriculture and Food Processing are among the largest. Hence, the internal market and the 
common agricultural policy in the EU intensify intra-regional trade in these sectors. For 
Textiles and Wearing Apparel, we also find a high and significant dummy. The dummy for Raw 
Materials is negative, but insignificant. This may be due to oil being intensively traded between 
EU members and non-members alike. For Transport Equipment and Other Services, we also 
find an insignificant EU dummy. This suggests that, in these sectors, trade among EU members 
is not significantly more intense compared to two otherwise equivalent countries that are not 
both EU members. The insignificant dummies may either refer to industries where the internal 
market has not progressed much or where technical barriers to trade are unimportant. 
 
The second column of table 3.1 shows the trade increase that corresponds to the estimated EU 
dummy. In particular, we assume that EU membership implies that the dummy would change 
from zero to one for bilateral trade patterns between the EU and Turkey. Thus, potential trade 
can be calculated as exp (β s), where βs denotes the estimated coefficient for the EU dummy in 
(1). To illustrate, the coefficient for the EU dummy in Wearing Apparel is equal to 0.49 so that 
the potential trade is exp (0.49) = 1.64. This implies that trade after accession to the EU is 1.64 
times as large as the actual trade between Turkey and EU members. The potential trade increase 
is therefore 64% of the current trade volume. For industries with an insignificant dummy, we 
assume that the dummy variable is zero. Hence, accession to the internal market is assumed to 
have no impact on trade. Overall, our estimates suggest a weighed average of the trade 
 
14 Note that the composition of sectors in this paper differs from that in Lejour et al. (2004).   
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increases of 34%. Hence, aggregate trade with the EU can rise by this amount if Turkey would 
be full member of the EU, as compared to the situation in 2001.
15 
Table 3.1    Trade increase and corresponding NTB per sector on the basis of EU-dummy 
  EU Dummy  Trade Increase in %  Non-Tariff Barrier 
       
Agriculture  0.75**  112  16 
Business services (incl. Communication)  0.56**  75  17 
Construction  0.23*  27  8 
Chemicals en minerals  0.34**  41  7 
Energy and raw materials  -0.04  0  0 
Food processing  0.81**  124  17 
Machinery and electronic equipment  0.16*  18  4 
Metals  0.20*  22  4 
Other manufacturing  0.25**  28  5 
Other services  -0.10  0  0 
Textiles  0.58**  78  12 
Transport services  0.14*  15  3 
Trade services  0.81**  124  24 
Transport equipment  0.05  0  0 
Wearing apparel  0.49**  64  10 
       
All sectors  0.29**  34   
       
Source: Dimaranan and McDougall (2004) and own estimations. 
** Significant at the 5%-level; * Significant at the 10%-level. 
 
After having determined the potential trade increase per sector, the next step is to translate this 
into non-tariff barriers (NTBs). These are presented in the third column of table 3.1. Following 
the methodology of Lejour et al. (2004), we translate the potential trade increase per sector into 
a Samuelsonian iceberg trade-cost equivalent. We refer to this as a non-tariff barrier. In 
particular, we recalibrate the Armington demand functions in the model (i.e. the preference 
parameters in the utility functions) such that these reproduce the original trade data (while 
NTBs are incorporated). Abolishing the NTBs for all sectors in our CGE model (which is 
discussed in more detail in section 4), we arrive at the trade levels that correspond to the 
predictions in the second column of table 3.1. Lejour et al. (2004) describe this procedure in 
more detail. The estimated NTBs depend largely on the sector-specific Armington elasticities in 
the model, which measure the sensitivity of exports with respect to trade costs. The NTBs in the 
last column of table 3.1 can be interpreted as the trade costs associated with non-membership of 
Turkey in the internal market.  
 
15 Flam (2003) arrives at an estimate of 45% by estimating a macro gravity equation on the basis of a panel of 15 countries 
and for the period 1990 – 2000. We adopt a cross-section approach, using bilateral trade between 38 countries for 2001.  
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3.3  Improving Turkish institutions 
It is sometimes argued that EU-membership may work as a catalyst for Turkish institutional 
reforms. For instance, by becoming EU-member, Turkey has to conform to all EU legislation 
and enforcement by the European Court of Justice. Moreover, via the method of open 
coordination, Turkey will regularly be assessed by the European Commission and other 
Member countries on its economic policies. EU-membership can thus trigger institutional 
reform in Turkey and reduce the widespread corruption. Today, the high level of corruption 
hinders economic transactions substantially. Internationally Turkey ranks low on the corruption 
index, as can be seen from table 3.2.  
Improvements in institutions and transparency may benefit the economic development of 
Turkey by improving its competitive position. To illustrate, De Groot et al. (2003) estimate this 
impact for a wide set of countries, using a gravity estimation approach. They show that a similar 
law or regulatory framework as in the EU could increase bilateral trade between 12% and 18%. 
Better quality institutions and less corruption would increase trade by 17% to 27%. Although 
we cannot explicitly attribute the extent to what EU-membership will actually improve 
institutions in Turkey, it is clear that these have to be reformed in order conform to the internal 
EU market and the acquis communautaire. It can not be excluded that Turkey also reforms its 
institutions without becoming EU member, but the possible EU membership can be an extra 
stimulus to carry out these reforms. 
By way of illustrating the importance of national institutional reform in Turkey, we have 
assessed the importance of corruption for trade relations. In particular, we have re-estimated our 
gravity equation on aggregate trade of the previous section, by including a multiplicative 
construct of the Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index for the exporting and 
importing country in the equation. The coefficient for this index in the gravity equation 
measures the systematic impact of corruption on the intensity of bilateral trade between 
countries. The results suggest a significant impact of corruption on trade (see appendix A).
16 To 
get a feeling for the quantitative importance of corruption for trade, we did the following 
experiment. Suppose that, by improving institutions and obtaining more discipline within 
bureaucracies, EU-membership of Turkey would raise the TI Corruption Perceptions Index of 
Turkey to a level comparable with Portugal, i.e. Turkey would rise from place 64 with an index 
of 3.2 to place 25 with a value of 6.3. By doing so, we find that aggregate trade of Turkey 
would rise by 57%. Compared to the EU-dummy for the internal market (which induces a rise 
in bilateral trade between Turkey and the EU of 34%, suggesting an increase in aggregate trade 
of around 17%), the impact of less corruption would be much bigger. If EU membership would 
 
16 The coefficient for the EU-dummy, measuring the impact of the internal market on trade intensities, does not significantly 
change if we add the TI Corruption index (see appendix A). We have also estimated the gravity equation with an alternative 
index, the so-called heritage index, measuring the degree of economic freedom. The trade increase of using this index is of 
similar magnitude as with the TI Corruption index. The results are available upon request from the authors.  
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indeed work as a catalyst for institutional reform, this therefore has potentially important 
economic implications for Turkey. 
It is also possible that EU membership is less successful as a catalyst for institutional 
reform. There is for example much resistance against the reforms so that they are difficult to 
implement. Assume that Turkey only rises to place 33 with an index of 4.9, a level comparable 
to that of Hungary. In that case, aggregate trade of Turkey would still rise by 28%. 
As we did for the trade effect of the internal market, we translate the trade increase 
according to the gravity equation into an NTB associated with corruption. We then follow the 
same procedure as in section 3.2, i.e. we will simulate the gradual removal of the NTB in 
section 4, reflecting a gradual improvement in the degree of corruption in Turkey.
17 
 
Table 3.2    Corruption index 2003 for a selection of countries, including their ranking 
Ranking of countries  Transparency International Corruption 
 Perceptions Index 2002* 
   
1.   Finland   9.7 
2.   Denmark/ New Zealand  9.5 
3.   Iceland  9.4 
   
7.   Canada/ the Netherlands  9.0 
   
10. United Kingdom  8.7 
   
18. Germany  7.3 
   
25. France/Portugal  6.3 
   
33. Hungary  4.9 
   
54. Greece  4.2 
   
45. Poland  4.0 
   
64. Turkey  3.2 
   
102. Bangladesh  1.2 
   
* Degree of corruption, perceived by business people, academics and risk analysts derived from surveys. The assessment is between 0 




17 Because we do not have information on the effect of institutional changes on sectoral trade patterns, we assume that 
trade is affected equivalently in all sectors.  
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3.4  Free movement of labour 
Forecasting the migration effect of Turkey’s accession to the EU is difficult. The same 
difficulty applies to the Central and Eastern European countries, however. A number of 
researchers have nevertheless attempted to come up with an estimate of the migration potential. 
These studies usually use historical immigration patterns to estimate the effect of income 
disparities (and other explanatory variables like unemployment or distance) on international 
migration. The estimates are then applied to the income differentials between the EU and the 
Central and Eastern European countries to obtain an estimate of the migration effect of EU-
enlargement. De Mooij and Tang (2003) collected twelve of such studies. The results of these 
studies have been extrapolated to show the long-term migration potential from ten Central and 
Eastern European countries to the EU-15. The long-term is interpreted as the migration effect 
15 years after the accession. De Mooij and Tang arrive at a median estimate of 2.9 million 
migrants in the long term from ten Central and Eastern European Countries. This corresponds to 
a net migration of 3% of the total population in Central and Eastern Europe or, equivalently, 
0.7% of the EU-15 population. 
To assess the migration potential from Turkey to the EU, we can follow a similar approach. 
In particular, we derived the implicit migration elasticity for the income differential from De 
Mooij and Tang (2003). Subsequently, we apply the figures for the Turkish population, and the 
income differential between Turkey and the EU-15 to derive an estimate for the migration effect 
from Turkey. Turkish income per capita, measured in purchasing power parities, is 31% of the 
EU-15 average in 2000. This is somewhat below the average of the Central and Eastern 
European countries. We take account of demographic developments in Turkey. The Turkish 
population is expected to increase from 68 million in 2000 to 86 million in 2025. By 
substituting these figures in the equation for the migration potential, we obtain an estimate for 
the migration from Turkey to the EU of 2.7 million people in the long term. This equals 4% of 
the current Turkish population, or another 0.7% of the current population in the EU-15.
18 
The destination of migrants from Turkey is not expected to be proportional to the population 
of EU countries. In particular, the migration literature reveals that the destination of migrants 
primarily depends on network effects, i.e. new migrants go to places where previous migrants 
have settled. Table 3.3 shows how future migration flows would then be distributed across EU 
countries. We see that a large share of Turkish migrants will reside in Germany (76%), which 
will receive more than 2 million Turkish immigrants. France (8%) and the Netherlands (4%) 
also host a relatively large share of Turkish immigrants and will receive, respectively, 213 
thousand and 107 thousand migrants.  
 
18 Note that this estimate is based on historical immigration figures that do not necessarily refer to Turkish immigration. 
Hence, the estimate does not account for specific characteristics of Turks.  
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Table 3.3    Expected destination of EU immigrants (in 1000), based on stocks in EU countries in 1999 
  In 1000  In % 
     
Total  2665  100 
     
Germany  2025  76 
France  213  8 
UK  53  2 
Italy  27  1 
The Netherlands  107  4 
Rest of Europe  240  9 
     
Source: Trends in international migration, OECD, SOPEMI 2001 for data on current destination; own calculations for expected 
destination of Turkish migrants. 
 
3.5  Access to EU funds 
The EU budget currently redistributes funds. In particular, a countries’ contribution to the EU 
budget comprises a share of VAT revenues (40%), customs duties (17%) and a share of GNP 
(43%). Overall, contributions are more or less proportional to a countries’ GNP. The 
expenditures by the EU are primarily directed to the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) (48%) 
and Cohesion Policy (33%). Especially the latter expenditure category is geared towards poor 
countries and regions. 
Being a relatively poor country with a large agricultural sector, Turkey would probably be 
eligible for a substantial net inflow of funds from the EU budget if the current rules would still 
apply after Turkish membership. For instance, all Turkish regions would become eligible for 
Objective 1 support from the Structural Funds under the current rules. Although these transfers 
are capped at a maximum of 4% of a region’s GDP, the total amount of funds to Turkey may 
run up to € 8 billion per year. This may encourage Turkish economic growth. Indeed, Ederveen 
et al. (2002) have performed a meta analysis on the growth elasticity of Structural Funds and 
find that the potential growth effect of structural funds that are equal to 4% of GDP may be 
0.7% per year. This, however, assumes that funds are spent appropriately on public investment 
projects with a high rate of return.
19 
Yet, the rules regarding the allocation of EU funds are unlikely to be the same when Turkey 
accedes to the EU. In particular, the coming enlargement in 2004 involves relatively poor new 
member states. Adopting the current rules would imply that expenditures increase considerably. 
For instance, IBO (2001) has estimated that the accession of twelve new member states 
(including Bulgaria and Romania) would increase expenditures on the CAP and Cohesion 
Policy by € 20 billion per year, which is approximately 25% of the current EU budget. 
Moreover, the transfers to the new member states would come at the expense of the funds that 
 
19 This figure is based on ex-ante analyses of the growth effect of structural funds, using simulation models. Ex-post 
evaluations, however, suggest a zero elasticity on average. Hence, there substantial room for improvement in the 
effectiveness of structural funds in terms of stimulating convergence, see Ederveen et al., 2002.  
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flow to the poorest countries in the EU-15, i.e. Spain, Portugal and Greece. Neither such a 
reallocation of funds, nor a substantial increase in the EU budget is likely to occur. Hence, 
reforms will probably be implemented before Turkey accedes to the EU.
20 As it is difficult to 
predict how these reforms will look like, we do not attempt to address this issue any further.
21 




20 The future increases in the CAP budget has already been limited. In particular, the increase in the budget is not allowed to 
increase by more than 1% per year in nominal terms, probably implying a decrease in the budget in real terms.  
21 Flam (2003) estimates the contributions and receipts by Turkey on the basis of GNP per capita and the number of votes 
per capita in the EU council. He predicts a total net transfer to Turkey after its accession of approximately € 12 bln. per year. 
Quaisser and Reppegather (2004) arrive at an even higher estimate of € 14 bln. per year.   
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4  Economic impact of Turkey’s accession to the EU 
This section explores the economic implications of the Turkish accession to the internal market, the 
potential improvement in national institutions, and free movement of labour between Turkey and the 
EU. We do this by simulating three experiments with the WorldScan model. For these experiments, 
we discuss the macroeconomic effects. For the simulation of the internal market, we also analyse the 
sectoral implications. In addition, we perform sensitivity analysis on some important assumptions 
regarding the simulations. Before elaborating on the results, we first give a brief sketch of the model 
structure.  
4.1  The WorldScan model 
WorldScan is a computable general equilibrium model for the world economy (see CPB, 1999). The 
model is calibrated on the basis of the GTAP database, version 6 (Dimaranan and McDougall 
(2004)) with 2001 as the base year. The database allows us to distinguish between a large number of 
regions and sectors. In particular, the EU is divided into six regions: Germany, France, UK, the 
Netherlands, Italy, and Rest EU. The countries that accede to the EU in 2004 are referred to as the 
Accession-10. Other potential accession countries are all distinguished separately, i.e. Bulgaria, 
Romania, Croatia and Turkey. The rest of the world economy is divided further into four other 
regions, namely, the former Soviet Union, rest OECD, Middle East and North Africa and Rest of the 
World (ROW). For each region, we distinguish between fifteen sectors. These consist of Agriculture, 
Raw Materials and Energy, eight Manufacturing sectors and five Service sectors.
22  
The heart of the WorldScan model relies on neoclassical theories of growth and international 
trade. Sectoral production technologies are modelled as nested CES functions. One of the nests is 
value-added. The production of value-added is modelled by means of a Cobb-Douglas technology 
with low and high-skilled labour and capital as inputs. The other nests are described in appendix B. 
In principle, there are fifteen intermediate inputs. However, only a few intermediate inputs are 
important in the production process for most industries. 
With respect to trade, WorldScan adopts an Armington specification, explaining two-way trade 
between regions and allowing market power of each region. The demand elasticity for manufacturing 
industries is set at 5.6. For services industries the elasticity is set at 4.0. On the capital market, 
WorldScan assumes imperfect capital mobility across borders. In particular, capital that is abundant 
in one region (and thus is relatively inexpensive), it is invested in another region in which capital is 
scarce (capital is expensive).  
Due to barriers in investing abroad interest rate differentials are only reduced but not eliminated. 
Consumption patterns may differ across countries and depend on per capita income. We assume that 
the labour markets for low-and high-skilled workers clear. In the baseline, labour does not migrate. 
 
22 As the model distinguishes only one aggregated agricultural sector, we are unable to explore the details of changes in the 
common agricultural policies of the EU.  
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Although WorldScan is rather comprehensive in describing trade relations and contains a detailed 
description of countries and sectors, it does not capture some economic mechanisms that are 
potentially important in light of the enlargement of the EU. For instance, the model does not include 
economies of scale. Economic integration may thus yield additional efficiency gains through better 
exploiting these potential scale effects. Moreover, WorldScan does not capture technology and 
knowledge spillovers, associated with increasing trade intensity between Turkey and the EU. Such 
spillovers, as well as other dynamic gains from economic integration, may yield additional benefits. 
They are, however, difficult to quantify and therefore not captured in our model. The simulations 
thus only capture the static allocative efficiency gains from EU accession.  
As discussed in section 3.1, the baseline scenario of WorldScan includes developments that can 
be foreseen, such as demographic projections, a gradual catching up process of Turkey, the EU-
accession of the other candidate member states, and the completion of the textiles and clothing 
agreement in 2005. Uncertain political changes are not included in the baseline. We assess the 
implications of EU-accession by running successively three alternative scenarios in which we 
impose (i) the removal of non-tariff barriers; (ii) an improvement in the institutions; and (iii) 
migration flows from Turkey to the EU. By comparing the outcomes of the alternative scenarios with 
the baseline, we obtain the impact of the Turkish accession on the economies of the EU, the other 
accession countries, and Turkey. In the experiments, we assume that Turkey enters the EU in 2010. 
The shocks are implemented gradually and the effects are evaluated in the year 2025 in which a new 
stable equilibrium is achieved.  
4.2  Accession of Turkey to the internal market  
We now discuss the simulation results of the Turkish accession to the internal market. In particular, 
we simulate a gradual abolishment of the NTBs presented in table 3.1. This removal of NTBs 
changes relative prices, exerts trade creation and trade diversion, changes the terms-of-trade and 
affects the incentives to invest. The macroeconomic and sectoral implications are presented in tables 
4.1 and 4.2. 
Macroeconomic effects 
Table 4.1 presents the macroeconomic effects of Turkey’s accession to the internal market. We see 
that GDP and consumption in Turkey increase by 0.8% and 1.4%, respectively. 
23 Welfare, measured 
by the equivalent variation (i.e. a measure for the rise in real private income) increases by 4.4 billion 
US$ in constant prices. For the EU-15, the economic effects are small. Welfare raises by 3.8 billion 
US$; expressed in percentage changes of GDP and consumption, this increase is not visible. Dutch 
exports to Turkey increase by around 20%, while imports grow by 25%. In terms of aggregate trade, 
this is an increase of some 0.2%. The Accession-10 countries also experience no significant impact 
on GDP, but an increase in consumption of 0.2%.  
 
23 This result is comparable to the effect of the customs union. Harrison et al. (1997) estimate a GDP gain of 1.0% to 1.5%.   
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These effects are the result of two main mechanisms. First, changes in the relative prices imply that 
countries can better exploit their comparative advantages. This causes trade creation, increases 
production efficiency and raises welfare. At the same, however, integration with Turkey causes trade 
diversion. Indeed, the rising imports from Turkey by a number of EU countries come at the expense 
of imports from other countries, primarily other accession countries that specialise in the same 
products. With the removal of NTBs with Turkey, these other accession countries no longer receive 
preferential treatment relative to Turkey and therefore face fiercer competition on the internal 
market. As a result, the gains for Turkey partly come at the expense of a loss in output in the Central 
and Eastern European countries. These effects are, however, small in macroeconomic terms. 
A second effect of the accession of Turkey to the EU is a terms-of-trade effect.
24 In particular, we 
see that Turkey experiences a terms-of-trade gain of 3.5%. This is not accompanied by a terms-of-
trade loss in other European countries: the EU-15 experience a terms-of-trade gain of 0.1% and the 
Accession-10 of 0.2%. The reason for the presence of terms-of-trade gains on both sides is that the 
abolishment of NTBs entails a reduction in real trade costs. As we measure the terms of trade as the 
price of exports relative to imports that holds just outside the domestic border, lower NTBs can raise 
the price of exports relative to imports in both countries.
25 The different magnitude in the terms-of-
trade effect among countries depends on the trade intensity between that country and Turkey. In 
particular, the export share of the Accession-10 and the EU-15 to Turkey is rather small, while the 
corresponding share of Turkish exports to the EU is relatively large. This explains the large terms-of-
trade effect for Turkey relative to the other regions. 
We can compare the effects in table 4.1 with those found by Lejour et al. (2004) for the 
Central and Eastern European countries. These simulations were also performed with the 
WorldScan model. The comparison reveals that the effects for Turkey are relatively small. 
Indeed, the enlargement of the EU with the Central and Eastern European countries yields an 
average increase in GDP by 5.3% for the accession countries, while consumption increases by 
almost 10%. For the Turkish accession, the corresponding figures are 0.8% and 1.4%. The 
reason for this difference is fourfold. First, we have re-estimated our gravity equations on the 
basis of more recent data for 2001. The new estimations suggest an aggregate trade increase for 
bilateral trade with Turkey of 34%. This is about one third smaller than the increase of more 
than 50% for the CEEC countries that was suggested by the previous estimate (which was based 
on data for 1997). Secondly, Turkey is less open to European trade than an average country 
from Central and Eastern Europe. Thus, the country benefits less from access to the internal 
market. This is reinforced by the relatively small share of trade with EU-countries, relative to 
 
24 Notice that his effect is not a traditional terms-of-trade effect, but the result of a change in transaction costs, modelled by a 
change in the Samuelsonian iceberg costs. 
25 For imports, the price includes cost of freight (the iceberg costs and the c.i.f - inclusive of cost, insurance and freight - that 
are present in the database) but not import taxes. For exports the price is f.o.b (free on board) and includes export taxes but 
excludes the iceberg costs.  
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the Central and Eastern European countries. Thirdly, Turkey specialises in sectors for which we 
find relatively small effects for the internal-market dummy. For instance, we do not obtain a 
significant NTB for Transport Services, a sector that is relatively important for the Turkish 
economy. We do have a large NTB in the sector Trade Services which is very important in 
Turkey. However trade in that sector is low and the trade increase has no substantial effect on 
production in that sector. Finally, the exports of Turkey primarily involve sectors with a low 
productivity such as agriculture and textiles. Although these sectors benefit substantially (see 
below), this does not create big effects on value added and consumption. 
Total exports of Turkey rise by 8.1% and imports by 12.2%. This is less than expected based 
on the gravity equation. According to the latter method aggregate trade would rise by about 
17%. There are several reasons for this difference. First, there is also trade diversion. Increased 
trade with the EU leads to less trade with other countries. This reduces the increase in total 
trade. Secondly, Turkey also needs (skilled) labour, capital and intermediate inputs, such as 
machinery and equipment, for production. These inputs are scarce. This reduces the trade 
potential. The predictions of the gravity equation do not take account of these general 
equilibrium effects.  
 
Table 4.1    Macroeconomic effects of Turkey’s accession to the internal market in 2025 









Export volume  
 
(%) 
Terms of trade  
 
(%) 
           
Turkey  0.8  1.4  4.4  8.1  3.5 
Accession-10  0.0  0.2  0.1  0.3  0.2 
Bulgaria  − 0.0  0.1  0.3  1.3  0.1 
Romania  0.0  0.2  0.0  0.8  0.2 
EU-15  0.0  0.0  3.8  0.2  0.1 
Germany  0.0  0.0  1.2  0.3  0.1 
The Netherlands  − 0.0  0.0  0.2  0.2  0.1 
           
Source: WorldScan simulations. 
 
The welfare gains of 3.8 billion US$ for the EU countries are negligible related to the total size 
of the economy. They remain positive, however, as most EU countries suffer only marginally 
from trade diversion, while they benefit from trade creation. In terms of consumption, the gains 
are larger tan in terms of GDP because the reduction in NTBs makes imports cheaper. Still, we 
do not observe these positive effects in the table as the effects remain small. The reason for 
these small effects is that Turkey is currently a rather unimportant trade partner for the EU. 
Reducing NTBs will raise exports for an average EU country by 0.2%. This increase, however, 
has no visible effect on GDP in one-digit figures.  
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Sectoral effects 
To understand the sectoral effects of the Turkish accession to the internal market, two shocks in each 
sector are important. First, an industry where an NTB is abolished faces fiercer competition on the 
home market as the relative price of varieties from the EU falls relative to domestic varieties. This 
causes a shift in consumer demand away from domestic varieties, leading to higher import intensity. 
The drop in demand for domestically-produced commodities lowers the producer price which causes 
a shift in resources away from the sector where the NTB is abolished. The second shock of the 
removal of NTBs is that the EU lowers its tariffs. This reduces the relative consumer price of 
Turkish varieties in the EU, causing a higher demand for these varieties. This exerts an upward effect 
on the Turkish producer price which attracts resources to this sector.  
The net effect is increased specialisation. On balance, a sector is likely to expand if a (large) 
NTB is abolished and if that sector exports a large share of its production towards the EU. If a sector 
produces primarily for the home market, cheaper varieties from the EU may render the impact on 
production in that sector negative.  
In addition to the two demand effects above, the removal of NTBs also exerts a supply effect. 
This is because the reduction in real trade costs changes input prices for two reasons. First, lower real 
trade costs reduce the price of intermediate inputs so that production costs fall. Second, production 
costs might also change by changes in relative factor prices.  
How all these forces work out in the model depends on the details of the input-output 
structure, comparative advantages and the trade intensity of sectors. The model consistently 
links these elements and shows how the various shocks and mechanisms ultimately affect the 
output structure. The results are presented in table 4.2. It reveals that Textiles and Wearing 
Apparel expand most. The expansion is the result of their strong export orientation and the 
relatively large NTB that is abolished. To illustrate, one quarter of Turkish exports is from these 
two sectors (but only 3.6% of value added is produced here). Hence, the effect of increased 
access to the EU market dominates the effect of cheaper EU products on the Turkish market. 
Also other sectors in Turkey gain. In particular, table 4.2 shows modest increases in Trade 
Services and Construction. Production in 8 sectors declines, most substantially in Chemicals, 
Metals and Transport Equipment. These are sectors where accession to the internal market does 
not affect trade costs much.  
The expanding sectors in Turkey come at the expense of the position of industries in the 
EU-15 and the other accession countries. Indeed, Agriculture, Textiles and Wearing Apparel 
contract in the EU-15, the Accession-10, Bulgaria and Romania. Workers thus shift from these 
sectors towards other industries which show a corresponding increase such as Chemicals, 
Metals and Transport Equipment.  
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Table 4.2    Sectoral effects of Turkey’s accession to the internal market in 2025  
                                (Numbers are relative changes in production) 
  Turkey  Bulgaria  Romania  Accession-10  EU-15 
           
Agriculture  4.9  − 1.0  − 0.3  − 1.1  − 1.0 
Energy  − 0.1  0  − 0.0  0.1  0.0 
Food processing  − 0.2  0.1  0.6  0.0  0.1 
Textiles  17.8  − 1.0  − 0.3  − 0.2  − 0.4 
Wearing apparel  14.6  − 0.8  − 0.2  − 0.2  − 0.3 
Chemicals and minerals  − 3.9  0.1  0.2  1.4  0.2 
Other manufacturing  0.4  0.2  0.2  0.6  0.0 
Metals  − 0.8  0.2  0.6  2.1  0.2 
Machinery and equipment  2.1  0.1  − 0.1  0.4  0.0 
Transport equipment  − 0.9  0.1  0.2  0.5  0.1 
Transport services  − 0.6  0.1  0.2  0.5  0.0 
Trade services  1.0  − 0.0  0.2  − 0.0  − 0.0 
Business services  − 0.3  0.0  0.2  0.0  − 0.0 
Other services  − 0.7  0.0  0.2  0.2  0.0 
Construction  1.2  − 0.0  0.2  0.0  0.0 
           
Source: WorldScan simulations. 
 
4.3  Institutional reform 
The second effect of the Turkish accession to the EU involves the potential improvement in 
national Turkish institutions. Indeed, to the extent that EU-membership triggers reforms, it can 
have important implications for the Turkish economy. We simulate institutional reforms by an 
improvement in the Turkish position on the TI Corruption Perceptions Index from place 64 to 
25. This implies an improvement in the competitive position of Turkey, as found by the 
estimations of the gravity equation of section 3.3: aggregate trade increases by 57%. Table 4.3 
shows the macroeconomic implications of removing the corresponding NTB, which measures 
the trade barrier associated with the poor position of Turkey on the Corruption ladder.  
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Table 4.3    Macroeconomic effects of a higher TI Corruption Perceptions Index for Turkey in 2025 
 












Terms of trade  
 
(%) 
           
Turkey   5.6  8.9  28.2  45.3  13.0 
Accession-10  0.0  0.4  0.2  0.4  0.7 
Bulgaria   − 0.0  0.1  0.5  3.7  0.1 
Romania   − 0.0  1.1  0.2  1.2  1.3 
EU-15   − 0.0  0.1  8.5  0.5  0.3 
Germany   − 0.0  0.1  2.1  0.5  0.3 
The Netherlands   0.0  0.1  0.6  0.3  0.2 
Rest of world  − 0.0  0.0  8.7  0.2  0.2 
           
Source: WorldScan simulations. 
 
From table 4.3, we see that an improvement in institutions raises GDP in Turkey by 5.6%, while 
consumption rises by 8.9%. Welfare increases by 28.2 billion US$ in constant prices. These 
macroeconomic effects are substantially larger than the impact of the accession to the internal 
market. This is because of several reasons. First, the estimated trade impact of the improvement 
in the Corruption Index is bigger than that of the accession to the internal market. Indeed, the 
aggregate trade increase is more than three times larger. Second, the improvement in 
institutions affects all sectors alike, including the sectors metals and machinery and equipment. 
This contrasts the simulation for the internal market where these sectors are affected relatively 
mildly. The strong reduction in the user price of these capital goods is important for the 
economic implications, as lower capital costs encourage investments and exert an acceleration 
of GDP growth.  
Other countries benefit from the improvements in Turkey’s institutions. The biggest gain is 
in Romania, where consumption rises by 1.1%, primarily because of cheaper imports from 
Turkey. The equivalent variation suggests that the EU-15 experiences a welfare gain equivalent 
to $ 8.5 billion. Real private income in the Netherlands expands by $ 0.6 bln. Dutch exports to 
Turkey grow by more than 50% by some US$ 2,3 billion. This amounts to more than 0.3% of 
aggregate Dutch exports. 
Although the institutional improvement potentially has an important economic impact for 
Turkey, these gains will only materialise if the accession of Turkey to the EU will indeed 
induce such improvement. In case the reforms are less fundamental, the Turkish position on the 
TI Corruption Perceptions Index ladder improves less. To illustrate, if Turkey climbs up to 
place 33, the level Hungary, aggregate trade will increase by 28%. In that case, welfare in 
Turkey increases by 11 billion US$, GDP by 2.3% and consumption by 3.5%.   
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4.4  Free movement of labour  
Turkish accession to the EU may also induce migration. Assuming that 2.7 million Turks will 
migrate after the accession (see section 3.4), we assess the economic implications by using the 
WorldScan model. Borjas (1999) argues that the economic impact for the countries of destination 
and the countries of origin typically depends on the skill level of the immigrants. We do not know 
the skills of the immigrants in advance: they can be either skilled, e.g. because educated people are 
more willing to migrate, or unskilled, e.g. because a restructuring of the agricultural sector in Turkey 
worsens the economic prospects in Turkey for the unskilled. To cope with this uncertainty, we 
perform two simulations. In the first simulation, we assume that the composition of Turkish 
immigrants is equal to the composition of workers in the EU (table 4.4). In a second simulation, we 
assume the all Turkish immigrants are unskilled. The two simulations thus provide a range for the 
likely economic consequences of the assumed immigration flow of 2.7 million Turks.  
Table 4.4 shows that migration reduces overall GDP in Turkey by 2.2%. In Germany, GDP 
increases by 2.2% while GDP in the Netherlands expands by 0.6%. As the decline in GDP is smaller 
than the outflow of people from Turkey, GDP per capita rises in Turkey. The reason for this is that 
capital is not perfectly mobile across countries. Hence, the lower supply of labour increases the 
capital/labour ratio in Turkey. This raises the marginal product of labour and thereby raises wages. 
For similar reasons, GDP per capita in Germany and the Rest of the EU decrease. Indeed, the lower 
capital/labour ratio causes a decline in the productivity of labour in these countries and thus a fall in 
wages. The effect remains small, though, because of the modest increase in the population size. On 
average, GDP per capita in the falls only marginally (not visible in one-digit figures). The effect on 
ratio between the wage rate of unskilled and skilled workers is negligible because we assumed that 
the composition of migrants is identical to that of the destination country. 
The effects on consumption per capita suggest a more favourable picture for Turkey and less 
favourable for the EU-15 than the figures for GDP per capita suggest. This is for two reasons. First, 
there are changes in the terms-of-trade. In particular, lower wages in the EU-15 exert a downward 
pressure on producer prices. The opposite holds for Turkey. This renders the terms of trade effect 
positive for the Turkey and negative for the EU countries. Accordingly, consumption in Turkey 
expands and in the EU contracts. Second, we assume that the Turkish migrants transfer part of their 
income to their families in Turkey. Indeed, as figure 2.5 suggests, Turks provide substantial 
remittances to their home country. Assuming that future Turkish migrants in Europe will also remit 
part of their income to their home country, consumption in the EU falls while it increases in Turkey.   
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Volume of GDP 
(%) 
GDP per capita 
(%) 
Consumption 





             
Turkey  − 3.1  − 2.2  0.9  2.5  − 1.2  0.1 
EU-15  0.7  0.7  − 0.0  − 0.2  0.4  0.0 
Germany  2.4  2.2  − 0.1  − 0.8  1.2  0.0 
The Netherlands  0.6  0.6  − 0.0  − 0.2  0.2  0.0 
             
Source: WorldScan simulations. 
 
The effects of migration in the EU and Turkey are different if all migrants are unskilled (see table 
4.5). Migration now changes the skill composition in Turkey and the EU. The relatively higher 
supply of skilled workers in Turkey exerts an upward pressure on the average wage and income per 
capita, as compared to table 4.4. The relative scarcity of unskilled workers also increases their wage, 
relative to that of skilled workers by 2.5% points (see the wage ratio). Consumption and GDP per 
capita increase by an additional 0.5% as compared to the case of table 4.4. In the EU, the wage of 
unskilled workers declines relative to that of skilled workers. For Germany, the decline is 3%, while 
in the Netherlands it is 0.7%. GDP and consumption per capita decline a bit more if all immigrants 
are unskilled. The effects for the EU-15 remain fairly small in macroeconomic terms. 














             
Turkey  − 3.1  − 1.8  1.4  3.0  − 1.1  2.5 
EU-15  0.7  0.5  − 0.1  − 0.3  0.5  − 0.9 
Germany  2.4  1.8  − 0.6  − 1.2  1.7  − 3.0 
The Netherlands  0.6  0.5  − 0.1  − 0.3  0.4  − 0.7 
             
Source: WorldScan simulations. 
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5  Conclusions 
We assess the economic effects of three shocks induced by the accession of Turkey to the EU: 
accession to the internal market; an improvement in national institutions in Turkey; and free 
movement of labour. We thus ignore the potential membership of EMU or the implications of 
transfers from the EU budget. Moreover, we concentrate on the long-term implications of the 
Turkish accession to the EU, not to short-term issues, and focus on trade relations, not to foreign 
direct investment.  
In analysing these aspects of the Turkish accession, we first derive a quantitative measure for the 
potential size of the shocks of the enlargement. Then, these shocks are simulated by means of a CGE 
model for the world economy. The simulations yield the following results. 
The accession to the internal market yields positive effects for Turkey: private income (a 
measure for welfare) increases by 4.4 billion US$ (approximately € 3.5 billion, assuming 1€ = 
1.25US$), while GDP expands by about 0.8% in the long term. Also the current EU-15 and the 
countries of Central and Eastern Europe benefit from the accession of Turkey to the EU, albeit only 
marginally. The largest impact in Turkey is apparent in the sectors Textiles and Wearing Apparel, 
which expand by respectively 18% and 15%. This comes at the expense of production of these 
sectors in Southern Europe and Central and Eastern Europe.  
The effects of accession to the internal market are small compared to the potential gains of 
improvements in national institutions in Turkey. Indeed, if EU membership would be able to trigger 
reforms in Turkey such that the country would climb on the so-called Transparency International 
Corruption Perceptions Index to a position comparable to Portugal, our analysis reveals that welfare 
could increase by 28.2 billion US$ (or € 22.5 billion) while Turkish GDP would expand by 5.6%. 
These effects are large, relative to the impact of the accession to the internal market. Also the EU 
benefits from the improvement in national Turkish institutions. 
Migration involves a third effect that is potentially important in light of the accession of Turkey 
to the EU. An expected inflow of 2.7 million Turks would reduce GDP in Turkey by between 1.8% 
and 2.2%, and increase it in the EU-15 by between 0.5% and 0.7%, depending on the skill 
composition of the migrants. In per capita terms, income in Turkey will rise while it falls slightly in 
the EU. If migrants are primarily unskilled, also wage inequality in the EU-15 is likely to rise. 
Summing up, accession of Turkey to the EU will bring economic benefits for Turkey, without 
exerting a big effect on current member countries of the EU or the countries from Central and 
Eastern Europe. Some sectors in Turkey will expand substantially, such as Textiles, but at the 
expense of these sectors in Central and Eastern Europe. The largest economic gains can probably be 
obtained through reforms of national institutions in Turkey that improve the functioning of the public 
sector and provide transparency to investors and traders.  
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Appendix A      Estimating the gravity equation and data 
Data 
The estimation results presented in section 3.2 make use of three data sets. The first is the GTAP 
database (pre-release 6.0) for the economic variables as bilateral exports, national income, industry 
production and tariffs. Second, to proxy trade cost we use distance data. We use the great circle 
distance between capital cities. Third, we use population data from the UN.  
  The 38 countries we distinguish in the sample are: Hungary, Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, 
Slovenia, Croatia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Bulgaria, Romania, Turkey, The Russian Federation, 
Germany, France, United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Austria, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Ireland, 
Italy, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Belgium, Luxembourg, Switzerland, Malta, Cyprus, Canada, USA, 
Japan, Australia, New Zealand and Rest of the World.  
  Due to the fact that some of the countries in the sample are not actual countries but combinations 
of countries (rest EFTA and rest World) we made some ad hoc choices for the distance variable. For 
rest EFTA we used the capital of Norway and for the rest of the world the capital of Kenya. 
Admittedly, these choices are blunt, therefore we explicitly check the robustness of our results for 
the inclusion of the rest of the World (which is more than changing the capital). Different choices for 
the other two ad hoc choices turned out to be harmless. Finally, our distance data do not distinguish 
between Luxembourg and Belgium. We therefore assumed distances between their capitals and other 
capitals identical. We only adjusted the distance between the capital of Luxembourg and Belgium 
(source: WWW.ANWB.NL). 
  In the following table we report the estimates of equation 1 in section 3.2. All real variables 
are defined in logs. An asterisk indicates no significance at a 5% confidence interval. the EU-
dummies are discussed in section 3.2. Here we take a closer look at the other parameters. The 
distance variable is negative and significant in all industries, except for transport services. The 
size of the estimated coefficient is, however, notably lower for service sectors. This indicates 
that, if the services are tradeable, distance matter less; a result that is intuitively clear once one 
thinks about financial services for example. The exporter and importer GDP coefficients are 
estimated precisely and are all positive. Nearly all of them are a bit lower than 1. This is a 
standard result in the literature.  
The table also presents the results for macro trade in two cases. The first case is only the EU 
dummy just for the sectoral gravity equation. The second case includes the transparency index 
as discussed in section 3.3. The index is a multiplication of the corruption indices of the 
exporting and importing country. Note that in the later case the EU dummy is still significant 
which implies that the extra trade created in the EU internal market is not caused by similar 
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Estimation results of sectoral and macro gravity equations 




Exporter GDP  Importer GDP  Distance 
             
Agriculture  0.75  − 0.42  − 0.23  0.71  0.67  − 0.71 
Business Services  0.56  − 0.07  0.06  0.84  0.80  − 0.17 
Chemicals  0.23  − 0.16  − 0.18  0.61  0.60  − 0.38 
Construction  0.34*  0.12  − 0.31  0.91  0.87  − 1.04 
Energy and Raw mat.  − 0.04*  − 0.38  − 0.26  0.77  0.74  − 0.97 
Food processing  0.81  − 0.08  − 0.22  0.71  0.71  − 0.64 
Machinery and 
equipment  0.16  0.24  − 0.17  0.96  0.86  − 1.05 
Basic metals  0.20  − 0.03*  − 0.15  0.73  0.87  − 1.13 
Other manufacturing  0.25  − 0.08  − 0.10  0.84  0.85  − 1.06 
Other services  − 0.10*  − 0.19  0.12  0.89  0.77  − 0.21 
Textiles  0.58  − 0.41  − 0.35  0.81  0.72  − 0.91 
Trade services  0.14  − 0.24  0.11  0.81  0.80  − 0.05 
Transport services  0.81*  − 0.27  0.00  0.87  0.79  − 0.24* 
Transport equipment  0.05*  − 0.06*  − 0.03  1.02  0.78  − 1.04 
Wearing Apparel  0.49  − 0.67  − 0.05  0.74  0.74  − 0.94 
             
Macro EU dummy  0.29  − 0.06  − 0.14  0.92  0.89  − 0.91 
Macro transparency   0.24  − 0.20  − 0.29  0.94  0.91  − 0.95 
             
  Export levies  Import tax  Constant  Transparency  R squared  Trade 
increase 
             
Agriculture  6.92  0.81  − 4.77    0.58  112.1 
Business Services  − 28.06  35.52  − 10.26    0.87  74.8 
Chemicals  − 43.76*  74.56  − 7.94    0.44  26.5 
Construction  7.49  − 5.13*  − 3.26    0.81  41.2 
Energy and Raw mat.  12.81  2.62*  − 3.00    0.50  0 
Food processing  − 0.76*  0.12*  − 5.64    0.62  123.7 
Machinery and 
equipment  − 7.97*  − 3.60  − 3.32 
 
0.82  17.8 
Basic metals  155.79  − 4.55  − 2.87    0.66  21.9 
Other manufacturing  1.48*  − 0.69*  − 3.43    0.78  28.0 
Other services  13.01  246.89  − 11.04    0.80  0 
Textiles  4.73*  − 4.42  − 3.10    0.69  77.8 
Trade services  75.77  640.44  − 11.06    0.84  15.1 
Transport services  18.07  299.09  − 10.68    0.81  124.4 
Transport equipment  − 5.87*  − 0.44*  − 4.23    0.70  0 
Wearing Apparel  5.27  -1.79  − 3.30    0.64  63.8 
             
Macro EU dummy  − 19.30  − 16.33  − 2.28    0.81  34.1 
Macro transparency   − 18.77  − 16.80  − 1.93  0.01  0.85  57.0 
             
* indicates no significance at the 5% confidence interval. Standard errors are not provided in order to save space (available upon 
request). 
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Appendix B      WorldScan and concordances 
This appendix presents more details of WorldScan. First, it presents the production structure 
with the relevant substitution elasticities. Second, it presents the Armington elasticities in the 
model, and finally, it gives an overview of the regional and sectoral structure of the model 
based on the GTAP database.  
Production technologies 
Sectoral production technologies are modelled as nested CES functions. The value of the 
substitution parameter determines the substitution possibilities between input factors. The top 
level, where the fixed factor is split off, is relevant only for the sectors agriculture, and energy 
and other raw materials. For all manufacturing and service sectors we assume constant returns 
to scale in production. In the next level of the production tree, value-added plus energy carriers 
and material inputs are subdivided. This CES-function has a very low substitution elasticity 
(.01), creating a Leontief structure. The nesting structure of the Material inputs has a 
substitution elasticity of .60. We assume relatively high substitution elasticities between Value-
added and Energy carriers (.50). The Value-added nest has a Cobb-Douglas structure. So the 
substitution elasticity between capital and labour is 1. 
Sectoral production elasticities 
  All sectors   Agriculture  Energy and other 
 raw materials 
         
Fixed factor and rest  0.10  0.90  0.20 








Energy and value added  0.50  0.60  0.10 
Capital and labour  1.00  1.00  1.00 
Intermediates  0.60  0.60  0.60 
 
Trade   
Trade represents the difference between regional production and consumption. With respect to 
trade, WorldScan adopts an Armington specification, explaining two-way trade between regions 
and allowing market power of each region. The demand elasticity for manufacturing industries, 
agriculture and raw materials is set at 5.6, based on the work of Hummels (1999). For services, 
the elasticity is set at a lower level: 4.0. Bilateral trade depends on consumer preferences for 
regional varieties of a good, and differences in relative prices. ` 
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Regional Concordance between WorldScan and GTAP 
Germany   
France   
United Kingdom   
Italy   
The Netherlands   
Rest EU-15  Spain, Belgium, Luxembourg, Austria, Denmark, Sweden, Finland, Ireland, Portugal, 
Greece 
Acession-10  Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Slovenia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Cyprus, 
Malta 
Bulgaria   
Romania   
Croatia   
Turkey   
Former Soviet Union   
Rest OECD  United States, Canada, Japan, Norway and Iceland, Switzerland, Australia, New Zealand  
Middle East and North 
Africa 
Rest middle East, Morocco, Rest North Africa 
Rest world  all other GTAP regions 
 
Sectoral concordance between WorldScan and GTAP 
Agriculture  Paddy rice, Wheat, Grains, Cereal Grains, Non grain crops, Vegetables, Oil seeds, 
Sugar cane Plant-based fibres, Crops, Bovine cattle, Animal products, Raw milk, 
Wool, Forestry, Fisheries 
Energy and other Raw mat.  Refined Petrol and Coal, Gas, Coal, Oil, Electricity and other Minerals 
Food processing  Processed rice, Meat products, Vegetable Oils, Dairy products, Sugar, Other food 
products, Beverages and tobacco 
Chemicals and minerals  Chemicals, Rubbers and Plastics, Mineral Products 
Metals  Nonferrous Minerals, Ferrous Minerals 
Textiles   
Wearing Apparel   
Other manufacturing  Leather products, Wood products, Printing, paper and publishing, Other 
manufacturing 
Machinery and Equipment  Fabricated Metal Products, Machinery and Equipment, Electronic Equipment. 
Transport equipment  Motor Vehicles and parts, Other transport industries 
Transport services  Water, Air and other Transport 
Trade services   
Construction   
Business services  Insurance, Other financial services, Other business services, Communication 
Other services  Gas manufacturing and distribution, Water, Recreational services, Government 
services 
 
 